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DISCLOSURE OF SOCIAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS
AT DISPOSITION
NAnRN WATERMAN*

Introduction
The new treatment orientation of some criminal courts and particularly
of the Juvenile Court has given rise to several procedural and evidentiary
questions with regard to dispositional hearings. The underlying conffict seems
to be between the social scientist, who claims he needs flexibility and scope
if his treatment is to be successful and the lawyer interested in civil liberties,
who argues that the only way to protect the individual from abuse at the
hands of these uncertain sciences is by stringent procedural regulations. Ought
the social scientist to be able to present to the judge his professional assessment without reserve, or must he be equivocal because the subject of that
evaluation will see the report and may take offence, rendering him hostile
toward those who are trying to help him? On the other hand, ought the subject
to be a helpless bystander while his character is being discussed by someone who has possibly known him for an hour or so?
The conflict is nicely raised in a recent case, Re C. (an infant). The case
was appealed from a Juvenile Court to the Supreme Court of Ontario, and
the unreported decision by that Court has caused great concern to the
professional people connected with the juvenile court movement.
THE CASE
The Facts
A 15 -year-old girl was arrested and brought into Juvenile Court for
shop-lifting (theft under $50). The girl was already on probation for two
previous appearances for truancy. In total there were four hearings over the
next two months after which it was decided that she should be sent to training
school where she would receive a more stable, disciplined, constructive
environment and at least learn enough skills to help support herself. In the
course of these four hearings long discussions took place between the girl,
the mother, the girl's supervising probation officer, a Catholic Children's Aid
worker, the school attendance officer, the girl's aunt, duty council and the
judge. A report on the girl and her home-life was prepared and submitted by
the C.A.S. worker and a psychiatric clinic (psychiatric interview with a
*Mr. Waterman is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
He has worked both as probation officer and as a legal clerk at the Provincial Court
[Family Division] in Toronto.
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report from the psychiatrist and then a report from a conference of all the
professional people in the case) report was submitted to the judge.
At the first hearing, the girl accompanied by her aunt decided to proceed
without a lawyer, at which point the judge instructed duty counsel to pay close
attention. After a conference with duty counsel the girl pleaded guilty. The
probation officer, the school attendance officer and the social worker all testified in court about the girl's past and present problems. At every hearing duty
counsel was present and both mother and girl entered into the discussion with
the judge and witnesses. Many of the items challenged by the defendant were
verified by further investigation or testimony.
The behavioural scientists were unanimous: the girl's major problems
were her mother (who had her own psychological problems, and who offered
the girl no discipline or sense of responsibility) and the girl's own poor selfimage (arising from a series of lengthy illnesses, obesity, below average
intelligence, rejection by her peers, and a weak father). The consensus was
that probation had proven unworkable, and the probation officer requested
that it be terminated. The school found the family unco-operative and irresponsible; and the psychiatrist concluded that this was the case of an immature
personality in a girl of borderline intelligence, hindered by physical, social,
and family problems. The social worker's report concluded that all the community's resources had been tried and proven inadequate, and that if the
girl were allowed to return home the situation would deteriorate; therefore,
it went on,
... the only way to help the girl is through training school which would offer a
stable, consistent environment providing regular classes, home economics and a
properly supervised diet. The structure of routine would help to reduce her feelings
of 'mere existene' through participation thus increasing her self-image and confidence.

The reports of the social worker of the Catholic Children's Aid Society,
the psychiatrist's report, and a report of a psychiatric conference were never
offered to the offender or her mother, nor were their contents disclosed to
them. They were, however, aware of the existence of these reports, but did not
request to see them.
Finally at the fourth hearing the Judge, over the protests from mother
and child, ordered the girl committed to training school, concluding:
I feel that I can only follow the advice that is given to me when I ask it. I asked
for a full-scale clinical report have asked for observations by the Catholic
Children's Aid Society. I depend heavily on the probation officer who deals with
the case and for me to turn around and flatly repudiate that is not to do this girl
any favours; whereas, what she really requires is indentification. This is an
opportunity that this girl needs and its been indicated that she must have it and
I must see that she gets that opportunity.

Later in response to the girl's comment that she wished to stay at home he
added:
What you want to do is like a horse running back into a burning barn. You want
to get back to a place where1 you can't get the education and training and opportunity to be a young woman.

I Trainscript of Evidence of proceedings in Juvenile Court.
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The Appeal
One month later an appeal from this order was heard by a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Ontario, in chambers. Leave to appeal was granted under
s. 37 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1952 c. 160 on the grounds put
forward by the girl's counsel that the trial judge:
... was presented with reports by a social worker of the Catholic Children's Aid
Society, a psychiatrist's report and a report of a psychiatric conference. These
reports, made numerous damning comments about the girl and her mother and her
home. They all recommended training school. None of these reports were shown to
the girl or her mother and at no time did the judge indicate that the defendant or her
mother had a right to cross-examine or call witnesses. The mother also complained
that the social worker advised her shortly before the last hearing that he would not
recommend training school which he subsequently did.

The notice granting leave pointed out that it is in the public interest to
know in what manner a juvenile and her guardian should be given the evidence affecting sentence. At the appeal the appellant argued that the learned
trial judge appeared to have relied primarily on the three reports (phychiatrist, psychiatric conference and social worker's) in ordering that the girl be
committeed to training school2 ; that the appellants were unaware of the
contents of these three reports and disagree with many of the assertions made
therein; and that neither the appellant nor her mother was given a full and
complete opportunity to cross-examine nor advised of their right to call
witnesses. Affidavits of the appellant, her mother, and of two neighbours were
filed, stating that the home and home life of this family was good. It was
submitted for the appellant that the failure to show the reports to the appellant

or her mother was fatal and that it amounted to a secret inquiry; and they
were ignorant of the case they had to meet, their right to cross-examine and
to call witnesses.
The respondent replied that if it was an error in law for the learned trial
judge to consider evidence not explicitly shown to the appellant relative to
the question of sentencing that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice
had been occasioned; and that this was a case for the discretion of the trial
judge. 3 The appeal was allowed and the Juvenile Court Judge's order was
varied so that the girl was released4 to the custody and control of her motherorder effective one month hence.

2 See text relating to footnote 1 for the most pertinent quotation. The other quotation states that "the professional people here are indicating that what this girl needs is an
opportunity to get away from ...apron strings"..."I am saying what the professional
people are saying not me"--Transcript of Evidence, p. 42-43, line 42, p. 42 and line 10
p. 43.
3Citing R. v. Bezeau [1958] O.R. 617 and the Juvenile Delinquents Act .s. 17 (1),
(2); s. 20 (1), (5).
4 The first obvious concern is that this order may be beyond the jurisdiction of the
judge to make in that it in effect confirms the committal but varies it from an indefinite
period to two months. We spoke to the appellate judge, and there seems little doubt
that this is what he meant. There is not, and never was intended to be, any provision for
a definite term committal to training school. A juvenile is never "sentenced"; punishment,
which the use of this term implies, is reserved for adults.
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The Significance
This seemingly unimportant, unreported decision given without reasons
has the possibility of producing profound repercussions in the Juvenile
Courts' use of background social and psychiatric reports. Such a decision
quickly became known to the juvenile and family court judges across the
province, to the probation services, to the Toronto C.A.S. workers and the
court psychiatrists. Many of the judges and others assume that the case
establishes a rule which would force them to disclose completely the contents
of every such report considered by them in sentencing.
By comparing the trial transcript, the arguments on appeal, and the
appellate judge's comments the case seems to demand:
(1) that the court take the initiative in disclosing the complete contents of all psychiatrist's and social worker's background reports
which it considers at disposition to the juvenile offender or his
parents
(2) that the offender or his representative must be informed that he
may challenge the contents of this report by cross-examination and
by calling witnesses.
Failure to follow this procedure may result in the lower court's order being
set aside or varied.
We will argue that the case, rather than establishing a precedent in the
area of disclosure, must more importantly be regarded as an example of the
breakdown in communications between the various parties and courts
involved. We take this case as an opportunity to examine what ought to be
the rules and procedures in the future.
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
Sentencing
The twentieth century has been marked by the great development of the
behavioural sciences and the welfare state. These intellectual and humanitarian
trends have been reflected by the rise of individualization of criminal justice
with its new rehabilitative-treatment orientation in sentencing. During this
century there has been increased recognition of the part played in crime by
social and environmenal factors. Efforts were made to mitigate the inhumanity
and injustice of laws which sought to treat all alike and the sentencing in
theory came to take into account both the individual criminal and the
offence. Social control and protection of the community became the justifications of any disposition and it was realized that this was best accomplished
by the permanent reclamation of the offender to be a productive citizen. The
judge was compared to a doctor, "first observing and studying a person's
symptoms to establish the nature and extent of his ailment, before a course of
treatment can be suggested." 5
5Advisory Council of Judges, GumEs FOR SENTENCING, (New York, 1957) 26.
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Effective, therapeutic sentencing was seen as being in the long term
interests of both the offender and society. It is a task which demands the full
use of man's increased knowledge of human behaviour so that the decision
might be made systematically, deliberately and rationally rather than haphazardly or intuitively. Sentencing in ignorance of pertinent information is
inefficient and inhumane. From this therapeutic approach arose the need
for the social scientist, the expert witness and the social investigation of the
causes of the anti-social behaviour. Thereby the social investigation and the
psychiatric report have become uniformly accepted as helpful tools which
allow the application of a scientific approach and anlysis by a professional
behavioural scientist to be introduced into the sentencing process.
If the criminal law and its administration is to develop efficiently to fulfill the
purposes for which it exists in an everchanging society, lawyers, magistrates and
judges ... must develop a new consciousness of the contribution that the6 social
scientist, the psychiatrist and the psychologist can make to the courtroom.
The approach has gained widespread acceptance, because it is based on values

and concepts which are consistent with current ideals in our society-respect
for the individual, the capacity of the individual for change, the belief that
behaviour has a multiplicity of causes which may be varied, the belief that sentencing is a semi-rational process which can be made more efficient by the input of scientific, empirical and factual knowledge and the belief that a degree
of precision in predicting the future behaviour is now possible. In recent years
many lawyers have expressed reservations about the appropriateness of such
an inexact science in the law, which derives much of its value in channelling
behaviour merely by being clear, predictable and appearing fair. These reservations have been supported to some extent by the inital attempts to empirically test the success of this new approach to sentencing. Studies of recidivism
rates cast a number of doubts on the effectiveness of present social science
theory as it is being applied to the criminal process.
Although information and expertise may aid the sentencing process,
wrong or misleading theories or erroneous facts will make the process inefficient and inhumane. It may deprive a man of years of freedom, society of a
productive member or as in this case a child of her family and home. There

are many dangers inherent in the use of social investigations and psychiatric
reports at disposition such as inefficient or inadequate investigation, an incompetent investigator, deceitful sources, inefficient techniques, judges unschooled
in the proper use of such reports etc. Such dangers may be discovered by
internal supervision, a careful judge or more qualified staff; however, all these
protections are beyond the control of the individual offender. What safeguards
has the subject either personally or through his representative? Is there a
right to see this report, to challenge its contents, to cross-examine its author
or his informants, or to exclude certain material because it breaches accepted
evidentiary rules? Such legal safeguards are unclear and unsettled. The basic
need in this area, as demonstrated by this present case, is for clearer rules
and increased understanding in relation to the use of these reports in order
6

McRuer, Sentencing, (1961), 3 C ANrAir JouRNAL OF CoRREcioNs 207.
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to promote an efficient compilation of material while preserving the meaningful
traditional common law rights of the subject whose liberty is at stake.

THE DISPOSITIONAL HEARING IN JUVENILE COURT
It must be remembered throughout that this case was tried under the
Juvenile Delinquents Act which expressly demands in s. 38 that:
Where a child is adjudged to have committed a delinquency he shall be dealt
with not as an offender, but as one in a condition of delinquency and therefore
requiring help and guidance and proper supervision.

S. 17 states expressly:
No adjudication or other action of a Juvenile Court with respect to a child shall
be quashed or set aside because of any informality or irregularity where it appears
that the disposition of the case was in the best interests of the child.

Evidentiary Rules and Juvenile Court-Generally
The question of what procedural and evidentiary rules apply to Juvenile
Court has largely been left unanswered by Canadian appellate courts and
commentators. The Juvenile Delinquents Act, s. 5 (1) provides that:
... prosecutions and trials under this Act shall be summary and shall 'mutatis
mutandis' be governed by the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary
convictions in so far as such provisions are applicable....

This would seem to imply that all the procedural rights provided for by
sections 708 and 709 of the CriminalCode of Canada applied, unless expressly
varied by other sections of the Juvenile Delinquents Act. Of interest to our
discussion in this paper is the right "to examine and cross-examine witnesses
personally or by counsel or agent' '7 and the fact that "every witness at a trial
in proceedings to which this Part applies shall be examined under oath". 8
It also seems that the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act0 would apply.
except where inconsistent with the express provisions of the Juvenile Delinquents Act. Section 2(e) of the CanadianBill of Rights applies to prevent the
juvenile from being deprived of "the right to a fair hearing in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and
obligations."'1 Therefore, it would seem that except as provided expressly by
the Juvenile Deliquents Act, the juvenile should have a right to all the procedural protections of the adult.
7 Criminal Code of Canada, S.C. 1953-4, c. 51, s. 709 (2). See R. v. Langenack
(1962), 132 C.C.C. 277, and R. v. Iguat (1965), 53 W.W.R. 248. (a review of the right
to cross-examine).
8 Code, s. 109(3).
9 R.S.C. 1952, c. 59.
10 S.C., 1960, c. 44, s. 2 (e).
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However, in practice, and even in academic writings, some of these rights
have been abridged in the name of the socialized, informal procedure authorized by s. 38 and s. 17 (1) and (2) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act. In
Regina v. Arbuckle," Mr. Justice Aikins of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia held that:
... nothwithstanding the informality of the conduct of proceedings permitted by

s. 17 of the Act it must be conducted on ordinary laws of evidence ... That a
proceeding may be informal does not mean that it may be conducted without regard
to the law of evidence, nor do I think that a failure to proceed in accordance with

the rules of evidence is a mere informality or irregularity with s. 17 (2).12

This decision was reversed upon appeal in that a hearing under s. 9 (the
waiver provision) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act was held to be admistrative rather than judicial and that:
... while the judge must act judicially in the sense of proceeding fairly ... it would

be incompatible with the essential purpose of the Act, namely, to see that a juvenile
delinquent is treated not as a criminal but rather as a misguided child... and is
provided with that care and discipline that should be given by its parents, to

restrict the Judge to the rules of evidence admissable in a Court of law. Accordingly,

on such an application the Judge falls into no error if he admits and considers

hearsay evidence.13
In general, Canadian precedent regarding evidence under s. 9 applications
does not require:
... the Juvenile Court Judge to base his opinion solely on sworn testimony and
an order transferring a juvenile to an ordinary Court which is based in part on

testimony of a probation officer will not on that ground be interfered
the unsworn
with. 14

It also appears that unsworn evidence by a probation officer regarding the
child's previous conduct and response to previous corrective treatment or a
written psychiatrist's report is admissable and sound evidence. 15
These cases are relevant to our present discussion in several ways. If we
accept that such a relaxation of the rules of evidence applies to the adjudication of issues in juvenile court then our arguments regarding the need for
and efficacy (i.e. capability of meaningful challenge) of disclosure of dispositional reports may be affected. Even if, as the Supreme Court of British

11 [1967] 2 C.C.C. 32.
12 Id. 32, 40.

13 Re Regina v. Arbuckle [1967] 3 C.C.C. 380, headnote. The issue in this case was

testimony by a probation officer as to his opinions that it was in the child's best interests
to be tried in the ordinary courts which was based on hearsay evidence of satements of
the child's teachers.
1 C.C.C.. 173, 174-5.
14Shingoose v. The Queen [1967] 3 C.C.C. 291 (S.C. of C.); R. v. Pagee [1964].
15 See R. v. Todd [1966] 3 C.C.C. 367; R. v. Pagee [1964] 1 C.C.C. 173.
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Columbia suggests, s. 9 (1) applications are administrative rather than adjudicative they still seem analagous to the Juvenile Court judge's administrative
task of sentencing and similar consideration should be applied to this stage
of the hearing. If evidentiary 16 and procedural safeguards are relaxed in
juvenile court when performing an administrative function, then there is less
compulsion from precedent to support mandatory disclosure. Also if the
ordinary evidentiary rules regarding hearsay, opinion, etc. do not apply then
social reports will be more difficult to attack suggesting a different method of
challenging the report than simple reliance on cross-examination and the
production of witnesses.

Evidentiary Rules and Adult DispositionalHearing
What are the evidentiary and procedural restrictions which govern the
dispositional portion of an adult hearing? In Regina v. Arbuckle the Court,
in answering Crown Counsel's contention that proceedings under s. 9 were
analagous to speaking to sentence which is nothing more or less than hearsay,
concluded that such hearsay evidence was permitted because no issue is
raised as to the accuracy of the statements, and if they were challenged the
17
judge would not act upon them unless they were properly proven. It is
generally accepted that the strict rules which govern the admissability of
evidence at the adjudication of guilt do not and should not apply to the
dispositional hearing.
What happens after verdict is very different from what happens before verdict.
After the verdict, there is no longer an issue between the crown and the
prisoner. The issue has been determined by the jury and there is no more room
for evidence except to inform the mind of the court as to what the previous
history of the prisoner has been, if the court desires to hear it, for the purpose of
enabling the court to assess the proper sentence... There is no obligation on the
Court to hear such evidence. One small point which shows the distinction between
evidence after the verdict and evidence before the verdict is the different oath

16The general rules governing admissability of evidence in Juvenile Court are
unsettled and many cases suggest an adoption of some of the general rules, at least at
the adjudicatory stage. Compare Regina v. McMillan [1967] 2 C.C.C. 12 where the
Alberta Supreme Court held that "conviction on a sexual offence is unsafe without corroboration" applies to prosecutions under the Juvenile Delinquents Act not withstanding
the absence of specific statutory provision to that effect, with R. v. Horsburgh [1966]
3 C.C.C. 240 at 244 per Porter C.J.O.: "The Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1952,
c. 160 is I think intended to be a complete code relating to the trial of juvenile delinquents... The Act provides that there must be corroboration of the evidence of children
of tender years, but make no provision for corroboration otherwise. Corroboration is a
statutory safeguard and since the Act omits to make further provision for corroboration it must not be taken to have been intended that corroboration is not necessary." See
also the judgments of Evans, J. and Laskin, J. (at 262) who disagree and also R. v.
MeBean (1953), 107 C.C.C. 228 that the same restrictions and considerations should
apply as under the Criminal Code.
17 [1967] 2 C.C.C. 40, 40-41.
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which used to be administered to the witness ...not an oath as to a matter in
issue between the Crown and the prisoner; it was an oath which was to inform
the court truthfully in answer to its questions.18
The position in the United States is much clearer and offers even less
protection than the Canadian in regards to the quality of evidence to be
received and the procedural protections to be provided after conviction. The
United States Supreme Court stressed the need to draw a clear line of
demarcation between "strict evidentiary procedural limitations" imposed on
on courts in adjudication of guilt by the Constitution and the relaxation of
these strictures when sentence is being considered.' 9 Mr. Justice Black notes
that traditionally the judge had wide discretion as to the sources and types
of evidence upon which he could base his sentence and such discretion was
even more necessary now.
Modern changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than
a century ago for observance of the distinctions in evidential procedure in the trial
and the sentencing process. For indeterminate sentences and probation have resulted
in an increase in the discretionary powers expressed in fixing punishments...
(dispositional) reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges who
want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than guesswork
and inadequate information. To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information
would undermine modem penological procedural policies that have been cautiously
adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation. We
must recognise that most of the information now ruled upon by judges to guide
them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information
were2 restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination. 0

Therefore, in the United States and probably in Canada precedent
suggests that dispositional reports are ungoverned by evidentiary rules and,
therefore, although loaded with hearsay and opinion, are admissable.
Absent statutory provisions, what rights should the defendant have,
based on the demands of due process and the elemental sense of fair play
and justice which underlies the British system of justice? It has been argued
that perhaps all constitutional guarantees may cease at conviction. 2 ' Such a
18 R. v. Butterwasser [1948] 1 K.B. 4, 8-9. See also Regina v. Arbuckle, 284-5 and
also the comments of Lord Goddard CJ. in Marquis (1915), 35 Cr. App. Rep. 33 at
35 that 'The learned Recorder seems to have some conviction as to whether he could
accept what he called "hearsay evidence" of character after conviction. Of course he
could. .. although the matter is not proved with the strictness which would be necessary
to prove an issue at trial ...After conviction, any information which can be put before
the court can be put before it in any manner which the court will accept." Hearsay and
opinion evidence is admissible but care should be taken in labelling it as such and disclosing the sources, c.f. R. v. Ellery (1921) 15 Cr. App. Rep. 143.
19 G. Parker, Use of the Pre-Sentence Report, (1964), 42 CAN. B. Rav. 629.
20Williams v. New York (1959), 337 U.S. at 246, 248-9. Many commentators
wonder whether, in light of the trend evidenced by In Re Gault, this question were raised
again to-day if the devision might not be reversed. Note also how this case was interpreted
and limited by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Rex. v. Benson and Stevenson
(1951), 100 C.C.C., 247. For another American decision stating that trial rules of
evidence need not be followed at disposition see Farrell v. State (1957), 131 A. 2d.
863, 867; and see H. P. Chandler Latter-Day Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal Courts (1951), 37 VA. L. RIv. 831.
21 See discussion under the advantages and disadvantages of disclosure regarding
due process and especially the quotation from People v. Riley (1941), 33 N.E. 2d, 872 at
875.
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relaxation of rights is justified on a moral rationale-i.e. through his antisocial behaviour the offender has given up some of his rights and is put at
the mercy of society, which must now prevent him from harming the community in the future. Rules of evidence governing adjudication may be
in-applicable because the inquiry is broader and more complex than the
simple question: "Did the accused do the act?" The inquiry must consider
medical and psychological information to understand the actual cause of this
behaviour. Evidentiary rules of exclusion derived from extraneous policy
considerations unique to adjudication would simply block information which
might be essential to the rehabilitation of the offender. 22 Therefore, we must
be careful that we do not frustrate the social purposs of disposition by the
blind adoption of the rigid procedural requirements of the adjudicatory hearing
Likewise we should not ignore the legal safeguards, such as adversary conflict,
which have proven valuable in protecting the individual over the years. The
appearance of fairness and justice must be retained.
Disclosure of Reports in Adult Court
Historically, the receiving of additional information from a police officer
at the time of sentencing was made in the presence of the accused. This practice was followed in Canada in Rex v. Benson and Stevenson23 which is the
most quoted Canadian case on this issue and generally lays down the practice
followed by most Courts in Ontario:
A pre-sentence report from a Probation Officer in so far as it contains factual
allegations prejudicial to the convicted person stands on the same plane as a
pre-sentence statement by a police officer. The principles applicable in either case
require that the convicted man be informed of the substance of the report or
statement in so far as detrimental to him so that he may have an oppolunity to
agree with or explain it or deny it. If the report or statement contains prejudicial
observations considered by the Court to be relevant and likely to influence
sentence and the prisoner denies them, then proof thereof should be given in open
Court when their accuracy can be tested by cross-examination. If the Court does
not consider the matters to be important enough to justify formal proof, they
should be ignored as factors influencing sentence.23 (emphasis added).
22 M. G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases [1966] Sup. CT. REV. 167 at 170.
23 (1951), 100 C.C.C., 247, headnote (note enabling legislation, The Probation
Act. R.S.B. C. 1948, c. 268 is essentially similar to its counterpart in Ontario). See also
Rex. v. Abbott (1940) 74 C.C.C., 318 at 323 (if judge knew something beyond what
was given in evidence it ought to have been disclosed and the defendant given the
opportunity to meet everything which calls for consideration); R. v. Markoff, 67 C.C.C.
311 (statements by policeman after a plea of guilty should be made in the presence
of the accused and if challenged proper proof should be required or the information so
obtained should be ignored by the Court in passing sentence); R. v. Piluk (1933),
60 C.C.C., 92 at 94 (follows R. v. Campbell infra); and R. v. Tolmie and Rambo
(quoted in Rex. v. Benson and Stevenson, supra.) (proper practice for magistrate to
explain to the appellants that these statements were made to him in a report and that they
are permitted to concur in or explain or deny them. If denied, Magistrate may require
proper proof or he may ignore the statement in passing sentence); R. v. Dolbec [1963]
2 C.C.C. 87 (non-disclosure of the sources of information and the lack of any opportunity afforded the appellants to rebut the contents of the pre-sentence report constitued
a miscarriage of justice. It was improper not to inform the accused of the substance
of the report and in so far as it contained prejudicial observation not to afford him
the opportunity of disputing the report and of testing its accuracy by cross-examination in
open court-once again only material detrimental to him must be disclosed).
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Therefore, the right is limited by these qualifications and complete
disclosure of such social investigations is not required.2 4 Therefore, except for
the provision in the CanadaEvidence Act, s. 12, regarding full disclosure and
strict proof of the offender's prior criminal record, there does not seem to be
an inherent right in the offender to complete disclosure of a dispositional
report. The manner and amount of discloseure appears to remain in the
discretion of the trial judge; although, he is warned that if upon review it
appears he was influenced by undisclosed detrimental factors in the presentence report, his sentence is likely to be quashed. Thus, if we can trust
the discretion of our judges this solution seems to have the advantages of
allowing the judge some flexibility and discretion in the use of the report
while at the same time protecting the offender by encouraging the general
practice of disclosure except in those special cases where the judge is willing to
risk appeal because of factors within a certain case which suggest to him that
disclosure would be harmful.
These cases seem to have had their desired effect in Ontario for the general policy of the Provincial Probation Services demands that the officer submit
copies to the Bench, the crown attorney, defence counsel and the offender
twenty-four hours before his hearing, subject to the guidance of the presiding
judge. If the probation officer is particularly worried about disclosure in an
individual case, he is advised to approach the judge with his reasons, and then
it is up to the judge to decide if and how the offender will be able to learn
25
the detrimental substance of the report.
Disclosure of Reports in Juvenile Court
With juveniles different practices are applied. "[T]he report is not
26
necessarily-in some courts is never-shown to the child or his parents".
It was and still is the general practice of Juvenile Court Judges in Ontario
not to disclose the complete contents of the report; at a conference last
September only one Judge stated that he allowed the child to see the report.

24 Commentators have suggested that this rule is unworkable and that it is foolish
to try to distinguish what factors in a report influence the judge's decision and which do
not. This criticism seems quite valid as it was our experience that usually the overall
tone and structure of the report may be the most influential factor. This is one weakness
then of any rule of selective disclosure. If we decide that everything in every report

should not be disclosed every time then someone must make the choice and this is
a function which we expect our judges to be able to fulfill in relation to other evidentiary
questions.
25 See Provincial Probation Services, MEMORANDA, Chap. C., p. 6 and Outerbrige,
HANDBOOK, I1 (15) Appendices A & B. See also Memorandum dated Dec. 1958 which
points out that the question whether complete disclosure has been made is often of
interest to the Court of Appeal and that this should be made a matter of record.
26
Outerbridge, HANDBOOK, V (21), Appendix C.
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To the best of our knowledge this practice continues despite the 2concern
7
raised by In Re C. which has been interpreted as requiring disclosure.
The second report in In Re C was that of a psychiatrist, and it seems that
different principles have been applied to such. Even Rex v. Benson and
Stevenson would extend special privileges to such reports:
Pre-sentence matters relating to the prisoner's mental condition should not ordinarily
be communicated to him because they are not a factor warranting a heavier
sentence than would otherwise be imposed and any allegation of mental instability
should be based on a psychiatric examination when it 28
could be determined whether
the result thereof should be disclosed to the convict.

Psychiatrists involved with In Re C., when interviewed argued that
since the reports could be very harmful if disclosed in toto or misunderstood,
or if parts were disclosed out of context, they should be able to request that
the report in whole or in part be kept confidential and that if it did have to be
disclosed they would like to be able to interpret it personally to the offender
in a clinical setting rather than have the court hand out copies. This view is
supported by the comments in R. v. Dickson:
It is not clear to me or any of His Majesty's Judges why it is necessary to serve
that report on the prisoner. In some cases I think it very undersirable because it
may sometimes
give him ideas about his mental condition which he perhaps should
27
not know.

However, it appears that this rational middle position may not be the law in
Ontario. In R. v. Bezeau 28 it was held that for the judge and crown counsel to

meet privately with a psychiatrist (defendant not notified nor present) to get
ideas about sentence was bad practice. The common law prohibited the judge
from making private investigations of his own without the knowledge of the
accused, and as a general rule the judge cannot interview ex parte a witness.

27

An interesting qualification (if we do accept the proposition of mandatory disclosure) may be found in Pinder v. Pinder (unreported B.C. decision) which holds that
failure to disclose the contents of a welfare report did not result in a miscarriage of
justice when the defendant's counsel had consented to this use of the report. Therefore,
under the present case law, a viable solution may be to have the judge disclose to the
offender's counsel and if he is unrepresented to duty counsel or appointing counsel and
getting his consent not to completely disclose the report to the child.
28 (1951), 100 C.C.C. 247, headnote. This reasoning does not seem to apply to
a treatment setting, if, understanding that treatment can be tyranous, we accept that
certain forms of treament may be considered heavier sentences than others (e.g. here
training school was considered a heavier sentence or punishment by all the participants
except perhaps the professional treatment personnel, than a suspended sentence or a
probationary order. Although such reasoning is inconsistent with the treatment philosophy it was not surprising to learn that even the Supreme Court Judge fell into the
error of considering training school punishment too harsh for the magnitude of the
offence.) Therefore until the treatment philosophy is completely accepted many people
will consider the pre-sentence report as increasing sentence. For an example of this
thought see R. v. Holden (supra) which states that heavier sentences must not be
imposed for collateral purposes which may be found in the pre-dispisition reports.
27 (1949), 34 Cr. App. R. 9 at 13.
28 (1958), 128 C.C.C. 35 (Ont. C.A.).
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Once again this right to disclosure has the same implied limitation as29 with
social histories-only that which influences sentence must be disclosed.
The English law is similar to the Canadian case law and many of the
Canadian cases follow earlier English cases in giving the offender a right to
know and meet any detrimental facts in such a report which influences sentence. Under the English CriminalJustice Act 30 a copy of such a report "shall
be given the court to the offender or his counsel or solicitor". The general
practice in adult courts in England is for the police to supply a report and
the offender is then given a chance to deny portions of it. If denied the judge
must either disregard the controversial statements or hear evidence on both
sides. 3 ' In Rex v. Pelz, it was carefully pointed out that the court was not
attempting to lay down a rule in such wide and at the same time such exact
terms as would cover every case as this would be impossible but that it was
hoped that such comments regarding disclosure would be a guide to the right
practice. Once again, the case seems to have worked out a viable compromise
which both protects the offender by encouraging disclosure in most cases and
in also allowing enough flexibility that if such disclosure would not be in his
interests the judge may refuse. There seems, at present, to be no requirement
of full disclosure or strict proof.
The most interesting case regarding access to hearsay evidence of a
"confidential" nature is the House of Lords decision In re K3 2 which denied
the mother the right to see the final reports of the Official Solicitor and a
psychiatrist regarding her suitability to have care and custody of children. It
seems that the issue was the exact one facing the court in In Re C. The
decision seems to turn on the fact that the wardship jurisdiction of the Court
of Chancery was a very special one in which the principles of natural justice
must bow to (or be qualified by) the principle of parens patriae. This
reasoning seems directly applicable to In Re C. However, the case was not
cited in argument, it may still be applicable in Ontario as In Re C is
unrecorded with no written reasons for judgment.
The situation in the United States is even more confused, and in general,
offers less protection than either in Canada or England. In a few states the
defendant has a statutory right to examine the report prior to imposition of
29

Such a restriction is of particular interest in In Re C. where the Trial Judge did
not even read the Social worker's report but rather relied on his oral testimony which
means that his decision could not have been influenced by any detrimental material
in the report and therefore within the case law, the appeal which was argued largely on
the non-disclosure of the social worker's report, should have been dismissed on this
ground.
30 1948, c. 58, s. 21 (5). For an earlier provision allowing character testimony by

both the Crown and the defence after conviction, see the Prevention of Crime Act, 1908,
8 Ed. 7, c. 59, s. 10 (5).
31 See Rex. v. Von Pelz [1944], 1 All E.R. 36 (duty of crown to keep policeman
to allegations of capable proof); R. v. Butterwasser [1948] 1 K.B. at 8, 9 (evidence
received after verdict should be given in open court), R. v. Weaver (1908 1 Cr. App. Rep
12 (damaging facts to be noted); R. v. Campbell (1911) 6 Crim. App. Rep. 131 at 132
(procedure of reports questioned).
32 [1963] 3 W.L.R. 408.
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sentence:3 3 in one state a right of access is specifically denied;34 and in the
remainder the statute is silent. When there is no express statutory provision
requiring disclosure, it has been held that disclosure is at the discretion of the
sentencing judge and is not a right.35 In several cases, disclosure of at least

enough of the adverse material in the report to enable the defendant to refute
it has been provided for 36 while in others non-disclosure was approved.37
Challenging the Report
Assuming a right of access to the report does the offender have a right to
cross-examine the writer or the informants? How is he to challenge errors he
finds in the report. As we saw earlier most of the Canadian and English
cases which give a right of access also give a right to cross-examine the
report writer, but the one right does not necessarily follow the other.38 Historically, at Common Law, a convicted defendant did not have the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, at the disposition hearing. 89
Therefore it would seem doubtful that the defendant has a right to confront
and cross-examine the report writer and a fortiori it would seem that he has
no such right with regard to the investigator's informants, absent any statutory
or case law provisions. 40 Of interest when trying to formulate a new rule in
Canada regarding the right to challenge and cross-examination in this area is
the McRuer Report's analysis of which participants in an administration
hearing should be entitled to procedural rights. It concludes that any person
3

3 Alabama, California, New Mexico, Ohio and Virginia.
Kentucky.
35 U.S.v. Schwenke (1955), 221 F. 2d. 356; State v. Moore (1954) 108 A. 2d. 675;
State v. Benes (1954) 108 2d 846; Smith v. U.S. (1955) 223 F. 2d 750.
36 See Zeff v. Sanford (1940) 31 F. Supp. 736 at 738; Driver v. State (1952), 92
A. 2d 570; State v. Harmon (1960), 157 A. 2d 394; State v. Fowler, 49 Mich. 234;
Kuhl v. District Ct. 366 P. 2d 347; Townsend v. Burke (1948), 334, U.S. 736. For a
further list see J. P. Higgens, Confidentiality of Pre-Sentence Reports, (1964), 28
ALBANY L. R v. 14.
37 The two most quoted American cases, both of which deny access, seem to be
Williams v. New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241 and U.S. v. Durham (1960), 364 U.S. 854.
The strong statements in obiter by Mr. Justice Black gives the impression that the American practice does not protect the accused from a sentencing judge considering factors
which are never known to him. This is the interpretation which has been followed by the
report writers in the United States. In Canada, Rex. v. Benson and Stevenson in explaining and distinguishing Williams limits it to the constitutional question (also points out
that the substance was disclosed orally and that the accuracy of the report was never challenged and concluded that it does not affect the person's common law rights to know
detrimental facts being used against him.
38 The cases definitely hold that the offender has a right to cross-examine any
person presenting evidence which is detrimental and may influence the sentence. See R. v.
Benson and Stevenson and R. v. Campbll supra at 132. In addition the appeal court may
seek further evidence and make a more comprehensive investigation-see R. v. Elley
(1921), 15 C. App. Rep. 143; R v. Markoff supra at 311-312; R v. Carey (1951), 13
C.R. 370 at 376; R v. Dolbec [1963] 2 C.C.C. 87.
39 Note Employment of Social Investigation Reports in Criminal and Juvenile
Proceedings (1958), 58 COLUMBrA L. RaV. 702.
40 See State v. Benes (1954), 108 A. 2d 846 (denies there is a right to crossexamination) but see Canadian cases cited above in footnote 38.
34
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substantially and directly interested or whose reputation could be prejudicially
affected by the inquiry should have such rights but considerable discretion
must be left with the person conducting the inquiry. The witness should have:
(a) an opportunity to be heard on any relevant matter.
matters
(b) a right to cross-examine witnesses in respect to relevant
41
statute.
the
of
purposes
the
frustrate
would
it
unless
The current practice in the courts of Ontario is to have the probation officer
present in court, be it juvenile or adult, to hear the evidence at the dispositional
hearing; but seldom does he give his report orally, and even less often is he
cross-examined on it. There is only one magistrate's court in Ontario which
makes a practice of having the probation officer take the stand. In Juvenile
Courts more use is made of the probation officer in court, and he frequently
speaks. However, he is seldom subjected to formal cross-examination, which is
considered by most juvenile court judges as being inconsistent with informal
procedure.
The legal position at present in Canada seems best summed up in Rex
v. Benson and Stevenson and in R. v. Bezeau. The offender has a right to
know the substance of the detrimental material in his report which influences
the judge's decision. There does not seem to be a right to see the full report.
Much discretion seems to be left in the judge as to if and how he will use the
report and how he will disclose it to the offender.
In Re C. and the Case Law
Returning to the realities of In Re C., it seems that there was oral disclosure of the substance of the psychiatric reports. The probation officer
testified in open court and did not submit a report. The social worker disclosed
the substance of his report by testimony. In fact, it seems that though he also
submitted a handwritten report, it was never read by he judge and therefore
could not have influenced the disposition. Parent, child and duty counsel,
all knew of the existence and use of the reports and did not request to see
them. 42
The social worker involved generally tried to explain the contents of his
report to the parents and child before the hearing, which he states was done in
this case. He also states that he was willing, and expected, to give his report
41

McRuer, Royal Commission, INQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGHTS, (Toronto: Queens
Printer, 1968), 447-52.
42
Mr. Peter Scandifflo, a duty counsel, was present at the hearing at which these
reports were introduced but did not speak during the proceedings. At the commencement of the hearing he was instructed by Judge that his comments would be appreciated at any time during the hearing (As for the other dispositional hearings, Mr. D.
Gastmeier and Mr. J. D. Webster were present as duty counsel.) This is of interest in
that his name was not recorded in the transcript and one argument at appeal was that
the defendant had not had the aid of any legal advice. Obviously if the child or her
mother had wished help at this time they could have requested it. They were aware that
duty counsel was there to help them as they had been so told at the first hearing and
Mr. Gastmeier had actively participated in the girl's behalf.
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orally in court and to be subjected to questions by mother and child. In fact,
he prefers this procedure and would like to see it continued as long as the
informality of the proceedings is retained. He submited a written report only
because there was a chance he might not be able to be present at the hearing.
The chief argument on appeal revolved around the non-disclosure of one phrase
in the social history-that the mother "had difficulty saying no to men", which
was interpreted on appeal to suggest prostitution or at least low moral
standards. This fact was not expressly disclosed at the hearing and the
offender's mother was not given a chance to deny it; however, it is of interest
that none of the additional affidavit evidence which was submited to the Court
of Appeal dealt with this point but rather simply tried to show that this was a
good home where the child was happy. In our opinion, from reading the
transcript, the reports and the arguments at appeal, the substance of the
reports was disclosed to the mother and child who were given an opportunity
to question the probation officer, the school attendance officer and the social
worker.
The offender and her mother were warned at all three dispositional hearings that the likely result would be committal to training school, as all the other
welfare resources of the community felt they could no longer help this girl.
It might be argued that since the mother disputed the views of the probation
officer and social worker, the judge should have required more certain proof
of these allegations. However, this point was not pursued by the legal arguments or the appellate judge's comments. If the case stands for the proposition
that there should be complete mandatory disclosure of the contents of dispositional reports, we would suggest that it is inconsistent with the present law in
Canada, England and the United States and is misconceived in its rigidity and
inflexibility.
TOWARDS A RULE
Considerations
A consideration which should help guide any new practice is that often
quoted from Rex. v. Sussex Ex. P. McCarthy:
[J]ustice should not only be done but appear to be done ...The course of justice
includes a fair conduct of44a criminal trial through all its stages from arraignment
to and including sentence.

It is unjust and dictatorial for a judge to make grave decisions to commit
an institution without allowing any opportunity to correct misinfora child to
45
mation.
If the court is to protect itself from error it must be its duty to verify
the truth of the matter contained in the pre-dispositional reports and to
discount any source wherein prejudice or unfairness could exist. On the other
hand there is the point of view which argues that,
44
See also Townsend v. Burke (1954), 334 U.S. 736 (discusses injustice of using
a report which is detrimental and possibly inaccurate).
45N. Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the
New York Family Court", (1963), 48 CORNELL L. lRv. 517.
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•.. any person indicted stands before the bar of justice clothed with a presumption
of innocence and as such is tenderly regarded by the law. Every safeguard is
thrown about him... After a plea of guilty admitted murderers are in a much
different position. As such they are felons. Instead of being clothed with presumption
46
of innocence they are naked criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled to justice.

One proponent of this view holds that any proposal for more full disclosure,
... stems not from actual experience which demonstrates that the existing practice
is unsatisfactory or defective but from a vague, quixotic notion that 'fairness'
required that even after conviction a defendant is entitled to have access
to all
the official information on his life and character that comes to the judge.47

An appearance of fairness would be promoted by disclosure in most
cases. In many cases the dispositional hearing may be as important as the
adjudication of guilt-certainly with regard to juveniles. The dispositional
hearing is also closely associated with the trial procedure temporally, by
nomenclature and by participants. In general laymen expect that similar practices will be carried over and are embittered if they are not. McRuer suggests:
The court should avoid leaving any impression in the mind of the juvenile that he
has been unfairly treated. To leave such an impression might result in the juvenile
concluding that if the State has no respect for procedural rules of a fair hearing
then the laws of the State are not deserving of his respect. One of the main purposes
of the juvenile court proceedings is to create a respect for the law. As the formality
of a hearing, however, may be relative to the age of the juvenile, less formality

may be required where the court is dealing with less mature children.4 8

The probation officer or other investigating official is a representative of the
court-a public relations man; and if we are to encourage respect for and
understanding of the system, he should be forced to deal with all people, both
subject and informants, in a straightforward manner. To make it the general
practice for the officer to explain to the informants and the offenders that the
information being gathered will be used responsibly but cannot be kept completely confidential (as the offender must be protected from secret erroneous
information) would raise the respect of all involved for the system.
Many of the criticisms of disclosure are based on the idea that an effective complete investigation and later treatment must be based on a relationship of trust and confidence which the proponents of non-disclosure argue is
promoted by the retention of confidentiality. This argument seems selfdefeating. In essence they are saying that since it would breach our relationship
of trust and confidence to allow the offender to read what we are communicating to the judge we wish to do it secretly, behind his back. It seems that the
investigators' integrity and this relationship of trust and confidence, in many
cases would be better promoted by a forthright honest disclosure to the
offender of the investigator's function and position in writing the report, of
how the material was to be used, and then by allowing him to see it to assure
him that it has not been misused. Such disclosure-confrontation could be
a useful part of the treatment process if done by the professional behavioural
scientists in a setting where implications could be explained and interpreted.
Such a sharing with the client may insure the maximum value in the use
4

v. Riley (1941) 33 N.E. 2d, 872 at 875.
Judge Carroll Rinks, In Opposition to Rule 34 (c) (2), Proposed Rules of
Criminal Procedure, [1944] FEDERAL PROBATON.
48 McRuer, 604, see footnote 35.
6People

47
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of collateral information. When the subject realizes that the purpose of the
investigation is to promote his own welfare he will be more willing to cooperate.
However, some information, which though necessary for the court if
it is to understand the offender, may be psychologically harmful if suddenly
disclosed to the subject. The report will contain an intimate character sketch
of the defendant which may with certain types of individuals be harmful to
his morale and his regenerative effort. This argument is even more pressing
when dealing with an immature, inexperienced juvenile. It is believed that
unsought revelations of their inadequacies as others see them may affect the
inidivduals' 49self confidence and block therapy not only immediately but
indefinitely.
Thus, discretion must be left in the judge whether or not to disclose the
contents of the report completely, in part, or not at all. It should be remembered that there will seldom be reason to suppress the whole of the report.
It has been pointed out by a knowledgeable, experienced probation officer
that perhaps 90 per cent or more of0 the material in most reports could be
revealed with no unfortunate results5
The most compelling incentive to disclosure is that it will help safeguard
both the court and the defendant from error. 51 Effective sentencing requires
adequate information; but erroneous information can do positive harm, depriving a man of his liberty, society of a useful citizen, and the law of respect.
No matter how competent the probation officer and how adequate his
report, we must remember that the collection and anlysis of this type of data
is an inexact science.52 The problem of a practice of non-disclosure is that
49
Dembitz, 516-7, see footnote 45. Only last summer there was a case brought
to the attention of the Probation Services where a pre-sentence report given to defense
counsel was "indiscreetly" given "in loto" to his client, who at the time was under
observation in the Clark Institute because he had attempted suicide. The report upset
him and it was necessary to put him "on special observation": a one to one, full-time
attention of a member of staff. See also Lord Goddard's comments in R. v. Dickson
(1949), 34 Cr. App. Rep 9, 13.
50 P. W. Keve, THE PROBATION OrmcE IvEsnTATs-A GriD TO Tn PRESENTENCE REPORT (Minneapolis, 1960) 9.
51 The probation office relates a case from Parry Sound where a serious injustice
was prevented because a pre-sentence report was disclosd to counsel who later in conference with the offender's father discovered that the Toronto police had mistakenly
forwarded a lengthy criminal record which was not the subject's. When this was brought
to the attention of the probation officer, further investigation was undertaken and an
addendum attached to the report correcting the error.
52 Part of the social scientists' reaction against disclosure may be defensive, in that
he feels that his honesty, integrity, responsibility, competence or professionalism are
being questioned. In most cases, this is not so and the advocates of disclosure are concerned that, no matter how competent, human beings make mistakes and that it is
wise if possible to provide safeguards to minimize the harmful result of such mistakes.
Remembering also our original warning that we must be cognizant of the realities of the
situation it must be realized that the chances that errors, biases and irrelevancies will
appear in the report are not imubstantial in view of the superficiality of many of the
investigations caused in large part by the heavy caseload of the officers, the pressures to
meet court deadlines and the immaturity of the behavioural sciences. (See Canadian Corrections Association, Recommendation 1 (3), where it is admitted that there is not
sufficient knowledge at present to determine the relevancy of different factors in determining disposition.)
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it is seif-insulative and therefore, the extent of errors that may creep in
and the efficiency and value of the system cannot be properly evaluated. 53
The social worker may reply by saying that if challengeable, the report
would be too limited in scope; and data necessary for treatment may have
to be excluded because there was not sufficient time or means to verify it
sufficiently to stand up under attack. These arguments seem weak rationalizations. If the material is so speculative or unsupported that it cannot be
defended to the satisfaction of the judge, then it should not be acted on,
especially if it means arbitrarily dealing with the offender. It is also argued
that disclosure would increase the already over-burdened investigator's workload. Even though this is valid, the answer lies in being more selective about
the number of reports assigned, more selective about the material to be
included (i.e. the length of the investigation) and in an increase in personnel,
not in sacrificing !he quality of the reports.
The behavioural scientist also argues that for all practical purposes, the
disclosure of a pre-dispositional report to the defendant or his counsel, by
seriously impairing the confidential nature of the report, destroys its value
to the court. In collecting this material friends, associates and relatives of
the offender, agencies with which he had dealt and the offender himself are
contacted. The information is collected not through mere questioning but
by the establishment of a relationship of trust and confidence. Any procedure
which silences these sources or makes it more difficult to get adequate information to write a complete report is, in the long run, to the disadvantage of
the offender. Also any procedure which forces a breach of trust between
the investigating officer and the people in the offender's personal environment
decreases the effectivenss of any later in-community treatment.
It also seems arguable that disclosure in many cases is meaningless,
because the offender is incapable of challenging the report effectively. 54 To a
certain extent this is true and in such a case disclosure may be used as a
subterfuge behind which the offender's rights are abridged unchallenged,
because of the apparent fairness of the procedure. This argument is diminshing in weight as the general population becomes increasingly educated and
knowledgeable. This increase in capability is especially evident when discussing juveniles and perhaps now for the first time the teen-ager in certain cases
may be even more capable of reading critically and challenging his report
than some adults. This problem is avoided also if the offender is represented.

27.

53 Higgens, Confidentiality of Pre-Sentence Reports, (1964), 38

ALBANY L. REv.

541n general, it was our experience that disclosure had no effect on the report at
all. For various emotional and phychological reasons (overawed, authority figure, "playbal" attitude, time of stress and uncertainty, insecurity, lack of education and experience, defeatist, lack of comprehension, etc.) the reports were seldom challenged except
for trivial factual details. Much of the report is filled with professional opinion which the
subject may not even understand never mind have enough knowledge meaningfully to
challenge. Since much of the content is hearsay, it is impossible to challenge
and any comments which the offender has about the sources' bias usually goes unrecorded
as the reports are already completed.
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It is then the lawyers' duty to verify questionable facts and allegations and to
be able to discredit erroneous expert opinion. 55 If the subject is unrepresented,
this difficulty may be abated by having disclosure preceded by an interpretative
session with the social worker, at which time the report could be adequately
explained. 56 The writers of such reports, being aware of the problem of
comprehension should be encouraged to keep the report simple enough to be
understood by the layman. If this restricts the writer too much, then he must
be forced to interpret any difficult professional jargon to the subject.
Another argument raised against disclosure is that it results in sentencing
delay. Although a short delay may be a minor imposition on the offender, it
must be balanced against the resulting sounder sentencing policy. If delay is
caused by the offender, in controverting material in the report, it is a privilege
for which he must pay with his own time.
All of the above considerations apply to the case of a juvenile as
equally as to the case of an adult. However, the report itself may be more
influential and therefore more misleading than in adult court, because of the
scope open to the judge in sentencing. Therefore, protection is more necessary.
But any suggested procedure should not be inconsistent with current informal
procedures. For example, although disclosure should be encouraged, formal
cross-examination should give way to discussion; and acrimonious adversary
proceedings should be avoided. Because of the child's more limited comprehension, oral explanation should be encouraged; and if he is represented by
counsel, the counsel should play a more active, protective role than is necessary in adult court.
After weighing the preceding considerations, we make the following
recommendations. The judge must have discretion to decide how, when and
to whom the report will be disclosed. With the juvenile, because of the great
variation in needs and the juvenile court because of the informality of procedure, the judge's discretion becomes even more important and necessary.
As we trust the judge's discretion with regard to other procedures, there seems
to be no reason why we should not here.
The practice regarding disclosure presently used by the Probation
Services in Ontario should be extended, in a modified form to the Juvenile
court. The underlying rationale of any decision by the juvenile court judge
must be the best interests of the child. This standard seems appropriate in
considering whether there should be disclosure or not, and if so, how. One
must realize that while, in general, some form of discloseure may be in the
55
The lawyer, if need be, could check and challenge the report without ever
disclosing the complete contents to the subject. This solution, then puts the discretion in
the lawyer, as to what should be disclosed and if he is in doubt he should consult with
the social worker or psychiatrist first. In discussing this with the social worker and
psychiatrist and probation officer connected with In Re C. they were all amenable
to such a solution and said that they would be available to any defence counsel who
wished to challenge them on their reports.
56
This was the suggestion of the psychiatrist connected with in Re C., and she
pointed out that this is now the standard practice; alhough, it was not at the time of our
case.
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best interests of the child, in some situations the child's best interests will be
served by concealment. We propose that the court should disclose that which
it considers influential. But we also feel that it should be able to disregard
certain material if it feels that disclosure would be harmful. In the interests
of expediency the court should be able to disregard contested material which
it does not consider significant. It should be able to authorize further investigation into challenged influential material. The court should discourage any
undue formalization of procedure and should encourage discussion-type
disclosure, hopefully making such disclosure and confrontation a part of the
treatment process.
However, a failure to follow such procedural guidelines should not result
in the over-turning of the disposition.5 7 The court should be encouraged to
take the initiative in pointing out the existence of the report and in summing
up the substance on which the judge intends to rely. If any question arises as
to the accuracy of the report during the hearing the court should be forced
either to order a further investigation or to disclose the disputed portion to the
defendant. If a question regarding the contents of the report arises, and the
child is unrepresented by counsel, rather than a disclosure to the parents or
the child, the court should take the initiative to have counsel appointed for the
defendant or to elicit the services of duty counsel.
The suggesions that if the child is not represented by counsel then
disclosure should be made to the parents is ill-conceived. Often the most
decisive segments of the juvenile report are those evaluating the home and
the juvenile's comments regarding the home. This material if disclosed to
the parents, could have a very detrimental effect on any subsequent in-home
treatment and perhaps even pose a threat to the child's physical safety. The
provision for disclosure to the parents seems premised in the idea that the
parent is interested in representing the best interests of the child. The almost
unanimous reaction of the people working in juvenile court is that often the
parents are indifferent, hostile or in a hurry to get away from the court. Often
they are incompetent, that being the main reason that the child is before the
court. Often, in fact, the court must actively protect the child from his parents.
These observations have several important consequences. First disclosure
to the parents should not be encouraged by statute. Secondly, rather than
ever disclosing to his parents the youth would be better served if a lawyer
was appointed for him by the court. Lastly, care must be taken when the child
is represented by the parents' lawyer as there may be conflict of interests and
the lawyer's loyalty will usually be to the parents, who retained him. Therefore,
in some hearings even though the parents have brought a lawyer, it may be
necessary for the court to appoint an independent lawyer for the child.
57See New Zealand, Criminal Justice Act (1959) s. 5 (3): "Failure to show or
give a copy of any report in accordance with this section shall not affect the validity
of the proceedings in any court or of any order made or sentence passed by the court."
and Juvenile Delinquents Act R.S.C. 1952 s. 17 (2). Although these sections may be
necessary to prevent harm to the child by the overturning of a sentence on a technicality, they are difficult to justify if the failure to disclose has prejudiced the offender.
In Re C. neither the factual content of the reports nor the girl's guilt was disputed and
yet the disposition was still varied.

